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This paper on cultural loops will begin slightly off-track, drawing on lessons that can be learned 
from a very basic non-terminating program, written in basic programming language:  
 
100 Print “an infinite loop is” 
110 Goto 100 
 
Run 
 
an infinite loop is an infinite loop is an infinite loop is an infinite loop is an infinite loop is 
an infinite loop is an infinite loop is an infinite loop is an infinite loop is an infinite loop is 
an infinite loop is an infinite loop is an infinite loop is an infinite loop is an infinite loop is 
an infinite loop is an infinite loop is an infinite loop is an infinite loop is an infinite loop is 
an infinite loop is an infinite loop is an infinite loop is an infinite loop is an infinite loop is 
an infinite loop is an infinite loop is an infinite loop is an infinite loop is an infinite loop is 
an infinite loop is ... 
 
The output will continue looping through this cycle ad infinitum. 
 
Suppose that somebody has entered this program into a computer and entered a “Run” command 
as illustrated above.  This somebody has then left the room and we enter a moment later.  What 
we appear to be looking at is, strictly speaking, an “infinite loop,” a programming sequence that 
has no condition for termination except for activation of the self same sequence.  The screen has 
been filled with seemingly endless repetitions of the same string: “an infinite loop is” (or is it “is 
an infinite loop,” or “loop is an infinite,” or “infinite loop is an”?).  In any case, we do not know 
that the loop is endless, nor even that this is a loop.  Perhaps we could imagine that after so many 
repetitions the output will change.  Perhaps we imagine that our absent programmer is really hard 
up for ways to pass the time and has spent countless hours entering repetitions of the same string 
into just one single line of programming: 
 
100 Print “infinite loop is an infinite loop is an infinite loop is an infinite loop is an infinite 
loop is an infinite loop is an infinite loop is an infinite loop is an infinite loop is an infinite 
loop is ... 
 
After several hours, perhaps the programmer finally tired of the exercise and finished off: 
 
... an infinite loop is really a finite loop that thinks it can last forever and ever amen.” 
 
For this matter, we might also wonder, as we watch the text scrolling up the screen, whether all 
of the preceding text has followed this exact pattern.  Perhaps we just happened to stumble into 
the room at that moment, reflected in the current output, when our absent programmer decided to 
interrupt typing up a treatise on infinite loops with a banal illustration of what might constitute a 
loop of this sort.  Wait for just a second or two more and surely the output will be different. 
 
Of course, in the present instance, we will be waiting for a very long time for any kind of change 
to appear in the output—how long is infinity again, does anybody know?  Perhaps there is folly 
in trying to second guess the next piece of output produced by a program, particularly when the 
evidence on the screen provides no genuine clues to the structure of the program for which it is 
the output. 
 
At this point I hear the cries of dissent.  How can I possibly say that the output of this program 
provides no clues to the structure of the program?  After all, are we not faced here with output 
that, at the very least, appears to be endlessly repetitive?  Without being drawn into a detailed 
discussion about the phenomenology of repetition, it is fair to say that, yes, when faced with the 
output on the screen as we enter the room, a reasonable expectation is that this output is several 
repetitions of a non-terminating series of repetitions.  As each string is preceded and followed by 
the same string, the evidence suggests that the strings running off both the top and bottom of the 
screen have been preceded by and will be followed by the same string, according to the pattern. 
 
Yet I maintain that we can never be absolutely certain that the next thing that will appear on the 
screen will be yet another repetition of the same string.  We cannot know the mind of the creator 
with sufficient certainty to predict this with perfect accuracy.  Certainly, anybody who presumes 
that the string of strings on the screen is part of some non-repeating body of text is less likely to 
be right than the person who sees the pattern and guesses that the program for which this text is 
the output is an infinitely looping one.  We need only to stop the program and bring it up on the 
screen to confirm the latter’s suspicions to be correct. 
 
With this very strategy, however, we also illustrate the correctness of the claim I have made.  In 
order to know with certainty what the program will be likely to output next, at some point we are 
required to terminate it and look at the program itself rather than its output.  In other words, we 
need to stop the output if we want to know what will be put out next.  The irony of this situation 
is of course that we cannot know from any series of outputs within an infinite loop that the loop 
is in fact infinite (or even that it is a loop), without first terminating the loop to look beyond its 
repeating output. An infinite loop is indeed a finite loop that we think can last forever and ever, 
amen. 
 
Douglas Hofstadter makes a similar point about the relationship between infinity and the finite 
parameters of strange loops in Gödel, Escher, Bach: An Eternal Golden Braid (1979).  Strange 
loop phenomena emerge “whenever, by moving upwards (or downwards) through the levels of 
some hierarchical system, we unexpectedly find ourselves right back where we started” (10).  A 
sense of paradox is associated with strange loops because they bring our notions of the finite and 
the infinite into conflict.  Some object (A) always seems to contain or be the root cause of some 
other object (B) in a finite relationship, yet B also seems to contain or be the root cause of A, a 
paradox of infinite indeterminacy. 
 
Yet the paradox emerges because we are blinded from looking beyond what appears to be a fully 
self-contained system of determinations, even if we are unable to resolve the paradox of whether 
A determines B or vice versa.  As we move upwards or downwards through the hierarchies in the 
system, we presume that we will move closer to its limit in either direction, yet we find ourselves 
perpetually drawn to reproduce the same steps within the hierarchy.  For this reason, Hofstadter 
also refers to strange loops as tangled hierarchies (passim).  The tangle is what draws us to repeat 
the same system of determinations endlessly, but Hofstadter points out that any system includes 
a protected or “inviolate level” which always remains “unassailable by the rules on other levels, 
not matter how tangled their interactions may be among themselves” (688). 
 
In the work of M.C.Escher, in particular, Hofstadter finds the most powerful visual realisations 
of strange loop phenomena: in Ascending and Descending, monks walk up and down staircases 
that loop around to join each other; in Waterfall, water falls into a pool that leads to an aqueduct 
flowing down to the waterfall that empties into the same pool; and in Drawing Hands, there are 
two hands that appear to be drawing each other.  In each of these cases, however, the resolution 
of the apparent paradox is in realising the hand of Escher at work beyond the hierarchy: 
 
[In Drawing Hands,] levels which ordinarily are seen as hierarchical—that which draws 
and that which is drawn—turn back on each other, creating a Tangled Hierarchy.  But the 
theme ... is borne out, of course, since behind it all lurks the undrawn but drawing hand of 
M.C.Escher, creator of both LH and RH. (689) 
 
The non-terminating program with which I began this paper provides a variation on this theme, 
since the output provides evidence of an infinite loop lurking in the structure of the program.  A 
termination of the loop to look beyond the output will confirm this.  Yet beyond the program is 
of course the programmer and, not necessarily the same person, the person who entered the “run” 
command to execute the program.   
 
In other words, there are several inviolate levels to consider in dealing with computer programs.  
The program itself contains the inviolate rules determining repetitions in the output.  Beyond the 
program is the programmer.  We might also consider the programming language and limitations 
of the technology mediating between the programmer and the program that is written, but I want 
to press ahead expeditiously.  Beyond the programmer, there is also an executor, somebody who 
activates the program, making possible the generation of output.  Perhaps we could refer to these 
two inviolate levels as those of the creator and the generator.  In his examination of the strange 
loop of Escher’s Drawing Hands, Hofstadter points out the hand of the creator lurking within the 
inviolate level beyond the frame of the picture.  We might add that as a work of art, the picture is 
not a free-floating object presented to us in any unmediated way.  The image circulates within an 
array of cultural institutions and contexts, all of which mediates our access to it, and which might 
be thought of here as the conditions for the generation of the image. 
 
Consider, for example, that we had never seen Drawing Hands before reading Hofstadter’s book.  
We would have to take Hofstadter’s word on the matter, that this drawing had been done by this 
Dutchman named Escher.  Hofstadter—or, to be more precise, the book which carries his name 
as its authorial signature—has made possible our access to the image.  Furthermore, it is within 
the context of a discussion about strange loops and such matters that we are asked to look at the 
image.  Now, suppose we were to put the book down and think little of it for some time, perhaps 
because we are not very mathematically minded and we sort of got muddled up a bit by some of 
the other parts of Hofstadter’s book.  Years later, we find ourselves in an art gallery, and there is 
a special exhibit of Escher’s work.  We stumble upon the original, stare at it for a moment, then 
realise that we have seen it before.  Suddenly, Hofstadter’s discussion springs to mind and we are 
reminded of strange loops and we think smugly, ah, this is no paradox, since the hand of Escher 
existing at an inviolate level has drawn both the left and right hands which appear to be drawing 
each other. 
 
This situation leads to a strange cultural loop, since our reception of an original artwork has been 
already shaped by something we have seen elsewhere, in this instance, a copy of that exact same 
artwork.  The point is of course that cultural products circulate within precisely just these sorts of 
loops all of the time.  Indeed, I maintain that such loops constitute culture.  Allow me to explain.  
What makes an object an example of a culture is its capacity to resonate with features that it has 
in common with other objects created within the same culture.  Words such as genre, movement, 
poetics or style (among others) refer to ways in which original works of art remain tied together 
within structures of repetition of core features.  In a similar vein, archaeologists excavating a dig 
and finding numerous pots will look for repeated patterns, shapes, and techniques to determine 
cultural affiliations.  The strange loop emerges around the vexed question of origins: is a culture 
made up of repeated patterns on pots, or does a culture determine repetitions of patterns on pots? 
 
At this point it should be pertinent to bring cultural theory into play.  According to the theoretical 
anthropology developed by Clifford Geertz in The Interpretation of Cultures (1975), culture can 
be defined as “a stratified hierarchy of meaningful structures” (7).  The ethnographic method that 
he calls “thick description” is designed to enable anthropologists to sort out these structures from 
the concrete complexes of behaviour that are observed in the field.  He takes as a reference point 
a question posed by the philosopher Gilbert Ryle: when is the closing of one eyelid a wink and 
when is it a twitch?  As Stephen Greenblatt summarises the point, the distinction is in the shared 
code, a distinction that “is secured by the element of volition that is not itself visibly manifest in 
the contraction of the eyelid; a thin description would miss it altogether” (2000, 23).  To compare 
this situation with the situation I described earlier, we can imagine thick description as a method 
for second guessing cultural output by moving from the perceived pattern to expectations about 
the mind and method of the creator.  The thickness of the description inheres in its intent to take 
fuller account of the conditions for the generation of this cultural output. 
 
Yet in practice, the method sometimes seems to rigidify.  For example, Greenblatt’s own literary 
criticism—referred to most commonly as New Historicism, although he himself prefers the name 
Cultural Poetics—is often accused of flattening out culture.  The method typically proceeds by 
considering together a literary text and the text of some contemporary domestic circumstance or 
event (a legal extract, a travel journal, a royal decree or such like), so as to find patterns pointing 
to the system of meanings underlining both texts.  Being unable to terminate the infinite loop of 
cultural production, whereupon all texts echo all other texts in something akin to what Michel 
Foucault called the “fantasia of the library,” the new historicist tries to work backward from the 
conventions of textual production to the cultural matrix beneath.  While Greenblatt frequently 
argues that a cultural poetics recognises the agency of the individuals who produce these texts, 
the core issues of methodology have at base been recently defined in terms of the inviolability of 
the base level of determination—the archive: 
 
If every trace of a culture is part of a massive text, how can one identify the boundaries of 
these units?  What is the appropriate scale?  There are, we conclude, no abstract, purely 
theoretical answers to these questions.  To a considerable extent the units are given by the 
archive itself—that is, we almost always receive works whose boundaries have already 
been defined by the technology and generic assumptions of the original makers. (2000, 14) 
 
Here again the tension emerges between the infinite and the finite in the attempt to come to terms 
with unidentifiable boundaries of the units of culture.  The resolution, curiously enough, is a loop 
at the core of Greenblatt’s cultural poetics: the structure of the archive determines for us the units 
of perception within which we view traces of culture, to determine the structure of the archive.   
 
Thus, from the perspective of Greenblatt’s cultural poetics, the stratified hierarchy of meaningful 
structures constituting culture is a tangled hierarchy.  Lurking at the inviolate level is, of course, 
Greenblatt himself.  Greenblatt, Geertz and many others who practice these methods for reading 
culture as a text recognise this inviolate level openly.  In the introduction to his landmark work, 
Renaissance Self-Fashioning (1980), Greenblatt confesses, “the resonance and centrality we find 
in our small group of texts and their authors is our invention” (6).  This confession leads me one 
step closer to my final point here.  Even as the method of cultural poetics tends at times to flatten 
culture out to nodes of production arising from a single, static archive, and threatens to forget the 
agency of cultural producers, the method itself relies entirely on the creative and constitutive role 
of the observer.  Greenblatt’s literary and cultural criticism functions in a way that bears striking 
resemblance to the flights of fancy we undertook in the opening passages of this paper, looking 
at a pattern of output and trying to imagine what the structure of production would be like behind 
this output. 
 
Like the archaeologists staring at patterns on pots, cultural theorists could sometimes be forgiven 
for overlooking the question of agency altogether.  One of the reasons for this is that we tend to 
think of agency in terms of a capacity to effect change, rather than in terms of the repetition of 
existing patterns and structures.  “Structure” and “agency” might seem to be mutually opposed 
terms in discussions of cultural production.  Yet the lesson we might be able to learn from these 
discussions of strange loops and cultural production is that agency is just as necessary to shaping 
the cultural matrix as it is to the realisation of this system in the production of culture.  When we 
find patterns, we are exercising the wholly productive force of the imagination.  Beyond creators, 
generators, programs, archives and so on, there is the observer whose capacity for making sense 
of texts is what ultimately gives to culture its contours, patterns and limits.  Furthermore—what 
remains to be discussed in another forum—this constitutive capacity is something that is present 
in everyday practice, not simply in the realms of anthropology or cultural studies. 
 
The person sitting in front of the television, for example, is in much the same situation as when 
we stared at the computer screen waiting to see if the output would change.  The decisions we 
make about whether we recognise patterns, locate meaningful structures and so on are similar to 
cultural reception or consumption, which I maintain is as productive as creation or generation.  It 
is the decisions we make that insinuate infinity when we observe a loop.  As we observed at the 
outset here, the infinity of the loop is not inherent in the structure of the output but in the way we 
choose to make sense of the patterns, what we imagined to have preceded the present text and to 
be likely to come after.  To illustrate the comparison between observation of an infinite loop and 
agency in the field of cultural production, in conclusion, we need only to go back again to where 
we started here, but I leave that task up to the reader. 
 
References 
 
Foucault, Michel. (1977) Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews. 
Trans. D.F.Bouchard and S.Simon. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
Gallagher, Catherine and Stephen Greenblatt. (2000) Practicing New Historicism. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 
Geertz, Clifford. (1975) The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays. London: Hutchinson.  
Greenblatt, Stephen. (1980) Renaissance Self-Fashioning: From More to Shakespeare. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 
Greenblatt, Stephen. (1992) Learning to Curse: Essays in Early Modern Culture. New York: 
Routledge. 
Hofstadter, Douglas R. (1979) Gödel, Escher, Bach: An Eternal Golden Braid. Sussex: 
Harvester Press. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
